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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
i (Filed Pursuant to Utah 
i R. App. P.35(a)) 
i Case No. 880710-CA 
In its May 25, 1990 Opinion, this Court overlooked or 
misapprehended numerous Utah Supreme Court decisions — especially 
those governing the marshaling doctrine, the legal principle on 
which the Court so heavily relied in the Opinion. In this 
extremely significant case, involving hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, this Court reached a tremendously inequitable result by 
failing to consider at all scores of legal authorities which compel 
a reversal of the trial court's judgment as a matter of law, 
irrespective of the correctness of the trial court's findings. 
This Court abdicated its duty — imposed by numerous Utah Supreme 
Court decisions — to address the legal arguments White Pine 
raised. If a rehearing is not granted, the Court — without ever 
considering Appellants' legal arguments — will have affirmed a 
judgment that is erroneous as a matter of law, and economically 
disastrous for the Appellants. In the face of contrary Utah 
Supreme Court decisions, this Court will also have announced a new 
and incorrect standard of appellate review. 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
This Court failed to recognize the extensive legal issues 
before it, and addressed Appellants' (collectively "White Pine") 
arguments as if they presented only issues of fact. Without 
addressing a single legal argument raised by the parties, this 
Court, without any discussion, affirmed the following legal 
conclusions of the trial court: 
Appellees (the "Sharps") did not breach the parties' 
contract by failing to reconvey property under a trust 
2 
deed, even though White Pine had paid for it and the 
parties' contract required the reconveyances as payments 
were made. 
- The Sharps' legally reconveyed the Property by signing 
a document consenting to the recording of a plat of the 
Property even though it contains no conveyance, release, 
or granting language. 
- The Sharps' breach of contract was legally excused by 
their reliance upon advice of counsel. 
The Sharps were excused from their contractual obligation 
to reconvey because White Pine, after paying for the 
property, failed to request the reconveyance of specific 
property prior to White Pine's default under the 
contract. 
White Pine was not entitled to the legal remedy of 
receiving specific reconveyances of property for which 
White Pine had expressly contracted with, and paid, the 
Sharps; instead, the Sharps were entitled to retain the 
substantial sums paid for the reconveyances and to 
foreclose their lien on the property they were obligated 
to reconvey. 
- White Pine first breached the contract by failing to pay 
approximately $3,200.00 in real estate taxes even though 
White Pine had paid more than $1,500,000.00 to the Sharps 
under the Contract. 
- The Sharps — as trust deed beneficiaries — legally 
granted an easement to themselves over a roadway owned 
by White Pine. 
Despite the parties' extensive briefing of controlling 
authority — and relevant authority from other jurisdictions — 
this Court failed to address any of the legal arguments because it 
concluded those issues 
strike at the trial court's determination of whether 
there was a material breach of contract, and if so, when, 
and by whom. Such questions constitute issues of fact 
for the fact finder. 
Opinion, p. 5. These are not issues of fact. Rather, they are 
issues of law which this Court is required to address. 
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II. Issues Of Breach And Performance Are Not, Under These 
Circumstances. Questions of Fact. 
The Opinion suggests this Court affirmed the trial court 
because questions of breach "constitute issues of fact for the fact 
finder." This proposition, however, is directly contrary to 
controlling Utah law. 
In Avaikos v. Lowrv, 54 Utah 217, 179 P. 988 (Utah 1919), 
plaintiff/seller sued defendant/buyer for unpaid amounts allegedly 
owing under two contracts for the delivery of wool. Defendant 
admitted the contracts and that he had only paid a specified amount 
thereunder, but asserted a counterclaim alleging the plaintiff 
failed to deliver the total amount specified. 
All claims went to trial before a jury, which returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount. Defendant 
appealed on three bases, including: (1) that the trial court erred 
in submitting to the jury the question of whether the amount of 
wool delivered substantially complied with the contract; and 
(2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
substantial compliance was a question of fact. id. at 989-90. 
In reversing the jury award, the Supreme Court held that 
where, as here, the facts are undisputed, "the question of whether 
or not they constitute a performance or a breach of the contract 
is one of law for the Court." Id. at 90 (quoting 13 C.J. 790 para. 
1011). Since the sufficiency of the amount of wool delivered 
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presented a question of law, the Supreme Court concluded that it 
was error to submit that issue to the jury. Id. 
Avgikos, then, represents the only controlling Utah authority, 
and it is directly contrary to this Court's statement that issues 
of breach and substantial performance are questions of fact. Those 
issues are issues of law, when, as here, the facts are undisputed 
or presumed to be correct. 
III. EVEN IF FACTS ARE CHALLINGED ON APPEAL. THIS COURT HAS A DUTY 
TO CONSIDER THE PARTIES' LEGAL ARGUMENTS. 
In its analysis, this Court mistakenly overlooked, and failed 
to apply correctly, two separate lines of controlling Utah 
authority which conclusively establish either that (1) none of the 
foregoing issues presents a question of fact; or (2) even if White 
Pine did fail to marshal evidence — a ruling White Pine 
respectfully submits is erroneous — this court nevertheless has 
a duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied the law. 
A. The Interpretation Of An Unambiguous Document Is A Question 
Of Law: The Construction Of A Document Is Always A Question 
Of Law, 
The briefs in this case make abundantly clear that the rights 
and obligations of the parties were governed by a July 16, 1981 
Memorandum of Closing Terms ("Closing Memorandum") (Ex. D-15); a 
Trust Deed Note (Ex. D-3); a Trust Deed (Ex. D-2); and a Warranty 
Deed (Ex. D-17) (collectively, the "Contract"). 
Of all the Contract documents, the trial court found only the 
phrase "pro rata cost to the purchaser", contained in paragraph 7 
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of the Closing Memorandum, to be ambiguous, (C. 16). The trial 
court accordingly permitted extrinsic evidence to interpret that 
phrase, but made no finding that extrinsic evidence was necessary 
to interpret any other portion of the Contract.1 None of the trial 
court's legal conclusions, which this Court affirmed without 
analysis in its Opinion, involves that phrase. 
Accordingly, the various breach issues on appeal involve 
unambiguous contractual language. The trial court's interpretation 
of such unambiguous language is to be accorded no deference on 
appeal, but reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assoc. , 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 
P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 
(Utah 1985); Bradshaw v. Burninqham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983); 
Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Crowther v. Carter, 
767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. 
v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1987). 
Moreover, regardless of why the trial court admitted extrinsic 
evidence, such extrinsic evidence is admitted solely for the 
1
 In a rambling footnote at page xii of their Brief, the 
Sharps claim the Closing Memorandum "ambiguous". The transcript 
page cited by the Sharps (Tr. 733) indicates only that "based upon 
para. 7 at least and potentially more" the trial court would 
continue to hear testimony regarding the Closing Memorandum's 
terms. In its conclusions, however, the trial court concluded in 
the last analysis that only para. 7 was ambiguous; and the trial 
court considered extrinsic evidence only to interpret para. 7. (C. 
16). Every other citation in the Sharps' footnote goes to the 
easement question, not to the breach issues central to this appeal. 
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purpose of interpreting the terms of an ambiguous contract. Once 
a contract has been interpreted, however, the construction of that 
contract "is always reviewed as a law issue." Fashion Fabrics of 
Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 25 (la. 1978) 
(emphasis added). 
Consequently, to the extent Contract provisions must be 
construed at all, questions involving (1) the Sharps' duty to 
reconvey; (2) the legal effectiveness of their purported recon-
veyances; (3) the effect of White Pine's failure to make specific 
requests; (4) White Pine's entitlement to the legal remedy of 
receiving specific reconveyances for which White Pine had already 
paid the Sharps; and (5) whether the Sharps — who owned no fee 
interest — were able to grant an easement to themselves, are all 
questions of law to be resolved de novo by this Court. 
B. To the Extent White Pine Challenges Findings. Those Findings 
are Irrelevant to the Breach Issues Central to This Appeal: 
Failure to Marshal Does not Relieve this Court of its Duty to 
Determine (1) If the Findings Support the Conclusions, or 
(2) Whether Those Conclusions Can Be Sustained Under Any Set 
of Facts, 
1. White Pine Challenged Only Findings Unrelated to the 
Breach and Reconveyance Issues, 
White Pine did challenge some of the trial court's findings.2 
2
 White Pine challenges (1) Finding No. 91 that the Sharps 
relied on the advice of counsel (Appellants' Brief ("AB") 22-24; 
Reply Brief ("RB") 23-24); (2) the findings pertaining to 
attorneys' fees (AB 47-48); and (3) the trial court's finding of 
market value (RB 12-13). Similarly, White Pine argues there is 
not evidence in the record to support certain legal conclusions 
made by the trial court (RB 20-21, 24). Obviously, it is 
impossible to marshal evidence when none exists. The only possible 
marshaling would be a citation to the entire trial transcript. An 
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None of these challenged findings, however, has any bearing on the 
breach and reconveyance issues central to this appeal. No matter 
how much evidence may or may not support the trial court's 
findings, this Court must nevertheless determine if the findings 
support the legal conclusions challenged in this appeal. 
2. The Court Misapplied the Marshaling Doctrine and Over-
looked Its Duty to Determine Whether the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact Support Its Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, or If The Trial Court Applied Erroneous 
Principles of Law, 
The marshaling doctrine provides: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's find-
ings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and then demon-
strate that even viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Unless the 
facts are marshaled, a trial court's findings of fact will not be 
disturbed. Id. Accordingly, in Scharf, where the appellant failed 
to marshal the evidence, the Supreme Court accepted the lower 
court's findings of fact. See, Id. 
Of critical importance, however, the Scharf court did not 
merely affirm the judgment at that point; instead, it proceeded to 
consider and address appellant's specific challenges to the trial 
court's conclusions of law. Id. Thus, even where an appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence below, an appellate court still has 
appellant simply cannot marshal the negative. 
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a duty to examine "whether the trial court's findings of fact 
support its conclusions of law and judgment." Sampson v. Richins, 
770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this duty, 
implicit in all the marshaling cases, to examine legal argument 
irrespective of the failure to marshal. For example, in Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), the appellant failed to marshal 
all evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact and thus 
accepted those findings. Id. at 150. The court, however, 
immediately thereafter acknowledged its "duty . . . to determine 
whether those findings [justified] the trial court's conclusion of 
law," and then independently reviewed that conclusion for 
correctness. Id.3 
The following cases demonstrate the two-step nature of the 
required analysis: When an appellant fails to marshal evidence, 
the trial court's findings are presumed correct. See, State of 
Utah v. Harrison, 122 U.A.R. 32, 34 (Utah App. 1989). The 
presumption is that the findings are supported by competent and 
sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court has applied this principle even where 
an appellant failed to provide the Supreme Court with any trial 
transcript. See, e.g., Powell v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1128 
(Utah 1975); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 
490 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1971). In both of those cases, the Supreme 
Court presumed that the trial court's findings were based upon 
competent and substantial evidence, and then automatically 
proceeded to determine whether those findings supported the trial 
court's conclusions of law. Id. 
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Co. , 701 P.2d 1078, 1085, n. 2 (Utah 1985). When "findings are 
supported by competent evidence, they will not be disturbed by the 
reviewing court, but if erroneous principles of law are applied to 
the facts, as they were in this case, judgment on such facts will 
not be upheld on review." Survey Eng'rs Inc. v. Zoline 
Foundation. 532 P.2d 748, 751 (Colo. App. 1975) (emphasis added), 
rev'd on other grounds, 546 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1976). 
The Indiana Court of Appeals succinctly described the 
appropriate two-step analytical process on appeal: 
[T]his Court will employ a two-tier standard of review. 
First, it must be determined the evidence supports the 
findings. Then the Court must conclude the findings 
support the judgment. 
Keystone Square Shopping Center Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 
459 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
This is the analytical process White Pine followed in its 
briefs.4 Moreover, it is precisely the approach this Court used 
4
 For example, in its treatment of finding no. 47, White Pine 
argued the trial court's conclusion that White Pine had established 
a "practice" could not be sustained, as a matter of law, in light 
of the trial court's unchallenged finding no. 28 that White Pine 
had only made a single request for reconveyance. (AB 25, RB 4-5). 
In making this argument to the Court, White Pine wrote that "the 
court's own findings (and omitted findings) concerning requests 
preclude a determination that there was a ^practice' of making 
vtimely' requests for the release of property." This is a direct 
challenge to a legal conclusion, not to a finding, and this Court 
has a duty to address that legal argument. In this regard, to the 
extent Finding No. 47 found a "practice" to exist, it is in reality 
a question of law. An appellate court is free to disregard the 
trial court's designation of "findings" and "conclusions", and is 
free to recharacterize the trial court's statements in a proper 
manner. See, Smith v. Maldonado, 103 N.M. 570, 711 P.2d 15, 17 
(1985); Maloha Village v. Kanar Elec. Co, Ltd.. 593 P.2d 375, 384 
(Hawaii 1979) ("A conclusion of law is not rendered immune from 
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in addressing the issue of attorneys' fees. Opinion at 6-7. White 
Pine directly challenged the evidence regarding their reasonable-
ness. This Court, however, did not refuse to reach the underlying 
legal issues. Rather, it engaged in detailed legal analysis 
notwithstanding White Pine's failure to marshal all evidence 
supporting the finding of reasonableness. This Court should have 
used this same approach on all legal issues, not merely on the 
isolated attorneys' fee issue. 
By failing to use this two-tiered analytical process, this 
Court precluded the appellate review of purely legal issues. For 
example, White Pine argued that, as a matter of law, White Pine is 
still entitled to a reconveyance of the property for which it paid. 
(AB 14-19; RB 8-14, citing e.g., Columbia Dev., Inc. v. Watchie, 
448 P.2d 360 (Ore. 1968); Burroughs v. Garner, 405 A.2d 301 (Md. 
App. 1979); Eldridge v. Burns, 76 Cal. App.3d 396, 142 Cal Rptr. 
845 (1978); Leisure Campground & Country Club Ltd. Pship. v. 
Leisure Estates, 372 A.2d 595 (Md. App. 1977)). White Pine argued 
that it was entitled to this remedy notwithstanding any of the 
trial court's findings, including its finding that White Pine first 
breached the parties' contract. This Court, however, never 
considered the issue of White Pine's legal entitlement to this 
remedy. Thus, in effect, the Opinion transformed the marshaling 
review because labeled a finding of fact."). 
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doctrine into a doctrine of waiver by its requirement that legal 
argument will not be addressed if the facts are not marshaled, even 
if those facts are fundamentally irrelevant to legal issues on 
appeal. White Pine respectfully submits this Court did not intend 
that result.5 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A Petition for Rehearing is appropriate when the appellate 
court has overlooked or misapprehended particular points of law. 
This Court's Opinion overlooks or misapplies three fundamental 
legal principles: (1) questions of breach and substantial 
performance are questions of law for the court when, as here, the 
5
 The "advice of counsel" issue also illustrates this unjust 
and inappropriate foreclosure of legal argument. White Pine 
argued, as a matter of law, that reliance on a counsel's advice is 
no defense to a breach of contract action. (AB 22, citing, Mann 
v. Glens Falls Inc. Co., 418 F.Supp. 237, 251 (D. Nev. 1974)). 
White Pine argued that no matter what the facts are, advice of 
counsel provides no defense to a breach of contract action. 
Because of its one-step analysis, however, the court will never 
reach such legal issues. 
Consider further, for example, a situation where (1) the trial 
court made 15 findings in an action where the sole defense was the 
statute of frauds; (2) none of those findings found a writing 
sufficient to take the alleged transaction out of the statute of 
frauds; and (3) the appellant never ordered a transcript because 
his sole issue on appeal was that the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in finding the contract to be enforceable despite the 
absence of a required writing. Obviously, the appellant would not 
have to marshal any evidence supporting challenged findings in 
order to argue on appeal that, in their totality, the findings 
could not support the legal conclusion. Nevertheless, under the 
Opinion, an appellant now must marshal all evidence regarding 
irrelevant findings as a condition precedent to having its legal 
arguments considered. 
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facts are undisputed or presumed correct; (2) the interpretation 
of an unambiguous document presents only questions of law, and the 
construction of a document is always a legal issue; and (3) the 
marshaling doctrine applies only when findings are challenged, and 
in any event does not eliminate an appellate court's duty to review 
for correctness the trial court's application of the law to the 
findings made. 
If a rehearing is not granted, this Court will have affirmed 
the trial court's judgment without ever addressing whether the 
trial court properly applied principles of law. That result, 
contrary to controlling authority, is economically disastrous to 
White Pine, which, according to the trial court's judgment, must 
suffer a forfeiture in a project costing more than 2.7 million 
dollars, because White Pine was late in paying $3,200.00 in 
property taxes. Such consequences, among serious ones obvious from 
the arguments made on appeal, underscore the responsbility of this 
Court to address the legal arguments made in this case. 
Moreover, if a rehearing is not granted, and White Pine's 
legal issues are not addressed, the Court's Opinion will establish 
a new and inappropriate condition for appellate review: all 
appellants will have to marshal all evidence to support all 
findings the appellants anticipate the appellate court may feel are 
disputed in order to avoid waiving their right to have their purely 
legal arguments considered. This Court should not turn the 
marshaling requirement into a waiver doctrine. 
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